



Article

The Destruction of a Generation by War: Syrian Families, Children's Education, and the Risks for Turkey

Mustafa Serdar Terekli, & Murat Yalçın Beşiktaş

Fenerbahçe University, Turkey

Correspondence: mustafa.terekli@fbu.edu.tr

Abstract

This study examines the phenomenon of migration, focusing on Syrian families under temporary protection who migrated to Turkey following the mass movement of people from Syria after 2011. The research explores the education of Syrian children and the risks faced by Turkey in this context. It also evaluates the economic, social, and cultural impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis on Turkey, highlighting both its positive and negative aspects, as well as related security concerns.

Syrian children require increased access to psychological and psychiatric healthcare services. However, many are forced to work under harsh conditions as cheap labor. The employment rates of these children, categorized by age groups, exhibit similarities to those in Turkey but differ significantly from global trends. Applying these observations to Turkey, this study discusses the stages of educational services provided to Syrian children and suggests practical recommendations to improve their quality.

The findings reveal that although Syrian children increasingly benefit from educational services each year, their participation rates remain below Turkey's national average. The study also highlights deficiencies in education, healthcare, employment, and socioeconomic conditions for children under temporary protection. Predictably, migration flows intensify during periods of intense conflict. Data from international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have been utilized in this research.

Keywords: Risk, Education, Forced Migration, Refugees

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Introduction

Over the past decade, migration, fragmented families, and deaths have increased both internationally and domestically. This trend has been particularly evident in the Middle East, a region dominated by ongoing conflicts. The Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, initiated protests that spread to Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Jordan, Yemen, and Syria. The Arab Spring undoubtedly tested Turkey's resilience. Initially, Turkey responded to the humanitarian crisis by opening its borders to refugees, particularly due to its proximity to Syria. As the war escalated, Turkey established container and tent cities in eight provinces to provide refugees with basic needs such as food, shelter, healthcare, and education. Under the "Open Door" policy, no Syrian refugee entering Turkey was turned away, and they were granted "Temporary Protection Status." Since 2011, approximately 4 million Syrians have entered Turkey without restrictions, initially residing in temporary accommodation centers before dispersing across various cities. This mass influx has raised concerns about Turkey's social and economic stability. Children, as the most vulnerable group, have been profoundly affected by the war. Typically regarded as passive individuals needing care and protection, children are also a capable and productive societal group whose emotions, histories, and opinions deserve respect (Hart, 2017).

In the last decade, it is estimated that approximately 10 million children have died in wars, and 300,000 continue to fight in conflict zones. The departure of specific age groups and the subsequent trauma they endure upon return pose significant challenges for their home countries and host nations. As of the end of 2023, more than 117.3 million people have been forcibly displaced globally, and 43.4 million have become refugees. If refugees were to form a new country, their population would rank as the 21st largest in the world (UNHCR Global Trends Report). This study aims to examine the risks associated with the large-scale migration of Syrian refugees to Turkey since 2011. As of April 2019, 1,655,381 Syrian children had entered Turkey, raising concerns about preventing a lost generation and addressing long-term risk factors for the country.

Methodology

This study examines the phenomenon of migration, focusing on Syrian families under temporary protection who migrated to Turkey following the mass influx after 2011. The research addresses the education of Syrian children, and the risks Turkey faces in this context. Additionally, it evaluates the economic, social, and cultural impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis on Turkey, highlighting both positive and negative

aspects and related security concerns. A descriptive approach was employed in this study.

The Arab Spring and Its Social and Economic Impacts on Turkey

The series of Arab uprisings that began in December 2010 and continue to impact North Africa and the Middle East is collectively known as the Arab Spring. These movements, initiated by the citizens of the Middle East, led to regime changes, leadership shifts, nationwide protests, occupations of public spaces, attacks on state and police buildings, prison raids, revisions, and other reforms. This wave of unrest, called revolutions, rebellions, or uprisings, has been widely studied and discussed under the name “*Arab Spring*” (Buzkıran & Kuybay 2014). The social and economic effects of these movements on Turkey, particularly due to the influx of refugees escaping the war in Syria, have been significant. Turkey’s refugee population under temporary protection reached 2,801,586 as of December 2016 and has grown to 3,649,750 as of 2024. Projections suggest that this number could exceed 3.7 million by 2025, with the population already surging significantly by 2019 (Aafad,2023).

Additionally, as of 2023, 230,000 Syrians have acquired Turkish citizenship, and the number of refugees under temporary protection now totals 3,381,429. Since 2011, Turkey has spent €40 billion to provide for the basic needs of refugee families, including care, health, food, fuel, and nutrition. However, the lack of international support poses significant challenges for Turkey’s future, raising concerns about the sustainability of such efforts. To ease this burden, the Turkish government has issued 20,000 work permits for Syrians and allowed approximately 13,000 to establish their businesses, despite the controversial nature of these measures. The fundamental agreements governing international refugee law, such as the 1951 Geneva Convention (adopted on July 28, 1951) and its 1967 New York Protocol (adopted on January 31, 1967), define the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers (Keles, 2014).

In this context, the European Commission pledged funding for Syrian refugees in Turkey during the EU-Turkey Summit held on May 29, 2015. Under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT), a total of €6 billion was allocated, with the first €3 billion fully committed to projects, and €2.07 billion disbursed to Turkey. Of the second €3 billion, €450 million was allocated to projects, and €149.77 million has been disbursed. Remaining amounts were scheduled for payment between 2019 and 2021. Moreover, the European Commission approved an additional €400 million support package for educating Syrian refugees in Turkey. This amount was directly transferred as a grant to the Turkish Ministry of National Education to enhance educational services further. The European Commission has also approved a new support package worth €400

million to educate Syrian refugees in Turkey. This amount will be directly allocated to the Ministry of National Education as a grant.

Table 1. Number of Syrians Under Temporary Protection (as of May 25, 2021)

Age Group	Male	Female	Total
Total	1,953,784	1,651,831	3,605,615
0-4	224,875	210,684	435,559
5-9	248,537	234,792	482,829
10-14	164,724	156,737	321,461
15-18	120,065	113,028	233,093
19-24	317,281	227,969	545,250
25-29	150,006	134,192	284,198
30-34	116,187	101,819	218,006
35-39	98,876	83,320	182,196
40-44	70,126	64,548	134,674
45-49	46,501	48,703	95,204
50-54	34,375	37,771	72,146
55-59	27,349	29,264	56,613
60-64	17,769	19,602	37,371
65-69	11,308	12,787	24,095
70-74	5,987	7,129	13,116
75-79	2,871	3,799	6,670
80-84	1,162	1,816	2,978
85-89	519	879	1,398
90+	276	514	790

Source: Directorate General of Migration Management, Ministry of Interior (December 31, 2024).

Table 1 shows that 74.5% of Syrians are women and children. According to the age distribution table published by the Directorate General of Migration Management, Syrian men comprise 51.5% of the total Syrian population, while the proportion of Syrian women is 48.5%. The number of Syrian men exceeds that of Syrian women by 89,192 people. The most significant gender difference occurs in the 25-29 age group, with a gap of 15,814 people. As the age range increases, this gap decreases. In age groups over 45, the number of women surpasses that of men. The total number of women and children constitutes 74.5% of the Syrian population (2,164,144).

There are 532,174 people in the age group defined as the young population, 15-24 years old. The proportion of Syrian youth in the total Syrian population is 18.3%, and the average age of Syrians is 21.7 years, which is 3.28% of the total population of Turkey. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), the population of Turkey as of December 31, 2023, was 85,372,377. In Turkey, 1,510,603 Syrian children aged 0-18. The number of Syrians under the age of 10 makes up nearly one-third of the total Syrian population, with 918,388 Syrian children under 10 years old.

Table 2. Syrian Refugee Accommodation Centers Under Temporary Protection and Their Numbers (as of 25.05.2021)

Province	Temporary Accommodation Center	Accommodation Type	Current	Total
HATAY	Altınözü, Yayladağı	Container	8,179	16,894
GAZİANTEP	Nizip	Container	3,732	3,732
Şanlı URFA	Ceylanpınar, Akçakale, Harran, Suruç	Tent / Container	17,100, 21,057, 9,729, 16,546	64,432
KİLİS	Öncüpınar, Abeyli Beşiriye	Container	9,898	24,164
K.MARAŞ	Merkez	Container	5,008	21,018
OSMANİYE	Cevdetiye	Container	3,352	13,585
ADANA	Sarıçam	Container	6,136	26,176
MALATYA	Beydağı	Container	1,977	8,964
TOTAL:				178,965

As seen in Table 2, Syrian refugees' needs in temporary accommodation centers are being addressed. For those living outside the temporary accommodation centers, the European Union has provided a fund of 348 million Euros under the "Social Integration Assistance (SIA)" program, which aims to assist foreign nationals under international or temporary protection. As a result of the applications, 1,447,000 Syrians have been registered. The monthly support of 120 TL provided to Syrians outside the temporary accommodation centers is transferred to those in need through the Turkish Red Crescent. Syrians who do not reside in temporary accommodation centers live in 19 provinces in Turkey, which forms the largest risk group from Turkey's perspective.

Table 3. Distribution of Syrian Refugees Not Residing in Temporary Protection Areas by Province (25.05.2021)

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City	Number (Thousand)	Comparison With City Population (%)
Istanbul	535,713	3.63
*Şanlıurfa	442,783	21.75
*Gaziantep	459,453	21.34
*Hatay	437,508	26.56
*Adana	254,861	10.66
Mersin	236,053	11.12
Bursa	182,662	5.69
İzmir	149,824	3.31
Kilis	114,814	80.55
Konya	122,238	4.83
Mardin	87,079	10.50
*Kahramanmaraş	87,045	7.60
Kayseri	77,746	5.59
Kocaeli	56,786	2.98
*Osmaniye	48,573	9.09
Diyarbakır	33,514	1.93
*Malatya	29,708	3.73
Ankara	91,312	1.66
Adıyaman	24,391	3.91

Source: <https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/>

Hosting Syrian refugees, which was initially perceived as a temporary situation, is now thought to be a long-term scenario for most Syrians in Turkey. According to studies, many Syrian refugees even desire to become Turkish citizens if given the opportunity (Apak,2015). Although these Syrian refugees, who are unable to enter the EU countries, face a migration wave that Turkey is trying to manage, according to the Migration and Integration Policy Index, which examines the migration and integration policies of countries under eight categories, political integration, employment integration, family unity, health, education, permanent housing, citizenship rights, and discrimination, Turkey ranks last among 38 countries in terms of integration policies (Kağnıcı,2017). Turkey's international obligations concerning refugees are defined within the framework of the Geneva Convention and the 1967 *"Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees."* However, due to Turkey's *"geographical reservation"* in the 1951 Convention, Turkey only accepts people coming from Europe as *"refugees"* while those arriving from non-European countries are considered *"asylum seekers"* (Tunç, 2015). In practice, Syrians in Turkey are living both in camps and outside camps.

Most of those living in camps are in a better situation regarding welfare and social services than those outside the camps. However, approximately 85% of Syrians live outside the camps. Therefore, the real scope of the problems faced by Syrians in

Turkey is concentrated in the urban areas where they live outside the camps. Social integration issues are prevalent among asylum seekers living in cities. It is important to note that the migration wave, initially seen as temporary, is increasingly becoming permanent (Oytun & Gündoğar, 2017). The most important issue to address in our country is “*Social Acceptance*,” which refers to the behavior and growing concerns of the Turkish people toward Syrians. There is a prevailing belief in societies that refugees are burdening social services and causing disruptions in public services. Furthermore, refugees are often blamed for causing diseases and crimes, leading to a lack of trust toward them. This perspective makes it more difficult for refugees to integrate socially. From time to time, negative attitudes, including racism, xenophobia, and hatred towards Syrians, are notable in Turkey. However, research reveals public attitudes and concerns in certain areas. Based on the findings of the research, the following results were obtained (Tunç, 2015):

- 45.3% of the society has placed a significant cultural distance from Syrians.
- 72.5% of the population views the education of Syrian children positively.
- 70.8% believe that Syrians have negatively impacted the economy and are seen as a burden on it.
- Almost half (47.4%) of the public is not supportive of permanent work permits for Syrians.
- A relatively warmer attitude (32%) is seen toward temporary work permits.
- 84.5% of the society does not favor granting citizenship to Syrians.
- 62.3% believe that Syrians pose a security risk.
- 45.1% of the public expects Syrians to return to their home countries.
- 66.9% of people do not believe that Syrians will integrate into Turkish society.

The results of the “*Social Integration*” issue between the two societies, examined through a SWOT analysis based on data obtained from official sources, are presented in Table 4.

Table 4. SWOT Analysis of the “Social Integration” Relationship of Syrians Living in Turkey

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Same ethnic origin- Same sect- A large portion of the population consists of children and young people who adapt more quickly to differences	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Different language- Different culture- Different lifestyle (early marriage, polygamy, etc.)- Different sects- Different customs and traditions- Different educational levels- Uneducated individuals- Lack of income-generating occupation
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Marriage is one of the tools for social cohesion- Multiculturalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Perceptions of social threats- Changes in the social, cultural, and moral fabric of the province- Increase in population density in the province- Changes in the demographic structure of the province- Increase in ethnic and sectarian polarization- Widespread use of unregistered/illegal workers in small-scale businesses- Risk of long-term disruption in the labor market- Unfair competition between companies employing unregistered workers and those not employing them- High unemployment rates from a macroeconomic perspective- Child labor- Risks in social perception- Public anxiety about job loss and the perception of losing job opportunities- The potential for this reality and perception to turn into a social reaction and the risk of social explosion- Negative effects of a 50% decrease in unskilled labor wages on the public

Individual Threat Perceptions	Urban Threat Perceptions
- Informal marriages	- Increase in irregular construction and slum development
- Divorces due to Syrian brides	Threats to Syrians
- Stateless children who cannot be registered in the population	- Inability to protect the legal status of Syrian brides without an official marriage
- Growing public reactions towards Syrian women	- Abuse of women and children
	- Marriage is becoming a means of financial gain
	- Viewing marriage as a way of salvation
	- Child labor
	- Risk of a lost generation

As seen in the SWOT analysis, while the coexistence of the two populations is viewed positively by the current government, there is a directly proportional relationship between the ratio of the Syrian refugee population to the local population in the provinces and the local population's perception of Syrians as a threat and their sense of insecurity. It is evident that "*Social Integration*" is becoming increasingly complex. This is because Syrian refugees are currently experiencing a sense of foreignness and undergoing an adaptation process. Once this process is overcome, it is a fact that they will likely demand some of the rights possessed by the Turkish people from the Turkish government. Due to socio-political and cultural differences, migrants face many challenges while adapting to urban life, which has already started to emerge in some of our provinces. Frequently voiced claims suggest that these people visit refugee camps to visit their families and rest. Indeed, the statement made by government officials that there is a separate refugee camp in the Altınözü district of Hatay, which hosts deserters from the Syrian army and injured members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), supports these claims. The media has frequently stated that this situation may harm Turkey's long-term interests and violate international legal principles (Sarıkaya, 2012). Looking at the economic impact of Syrians in Turkey, it is evident that a complex picture of risks and opportunities exists (Oytun & Gündoğar, 2015). The weakest aspect of the economic impact is the high cost paid for Syrians. According to official figures from the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), a total of 5.6 billion dollars has been spent. For every 17 dollars Turkey spends on aid, international actors, including the UN, have only contributed 1 dollar. The support from international organizations and countries amounts to only

one-seventeenth of Turkey's assistance (Oktay,2019). According to a statement made at the Islamic Cooperation Organization's National Red Crescent and Red Cross Network Cooperation Meeting, it was reported that *"racist attacks targeting refugees and foreigners have increased across Europe, and we will establish safe zones for Syrians to return."* The statement also emphasized that *"35 billion dollars have been allocated to Syrian refugees, and despite the EU's promises, they have not fulfilled them."* The SWOT analysis of the economic impact of Syrian refugees on Turkey since 2011 is shown in Table 5.

Table 5. SWOT Analysis of the Impact of Syrians Living in Turkey on the Economy

		Weaknesses	
Strengths			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence of Syrian traders and investors with trade and investment relations with Middle Eastern countries. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High cost of the refugee crisis. • Insufficient international financial support. • High number of refugees in the lower-income group. • High number of refugees with low education levels. • Education costs. 	
Opportunities		Threats	
Macro-level opportunities		Macro-level threats	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Syrians bringing capital, investment, and commercial connections to Turkey. • Foreign capital inflow. • Provide humanitarian aid materials by local companies to revitalize the economy of border provinces. • Trade opportunities the port offers for Syrian investors and the trade potential of certain provinces. • Contribution of the increase in the labor force to investors. • Contribution of small Syrian businesses relocating to Turkey to production. • Economic mobility was brought to the provinces by the new economy created by the Syrians. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High cost of the refugee crisis. • Burden on the General Budget due to the crisis cost. • Loss of taxes due to businesses operating illegally. 	
		Micro-level threats	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in rental prices in border provinces. • Difficulty finding rental housing in border provinces. • Increased cost of living and inflation in border provinces. 	

Opportunities**Threats**

- Public perception that Syrians harm the Turkish economy.
- Public objection to providing aid to Syrians while there are poor people in Turkey.

As seen in Table 5, the biggest issue for the Turkish economy is that the crisis has incurred very high costs, most of which Turkey has borne alone. The likelihood that this issue will grow progressively each year is also high. According to official statements, the amount of money spent by Turkey on Syrian refugees since 2011 has reached 40 billion dollars. Europe, which did not want to experience a massive influx of migrants, placed a significant responsibility in Turkey by offering a settlement package. Particularly after the terrorist attacks in Paris, the closing of European borders to Syrians further increased the impact of the refugee population in Turkey. This has naturally harmed the Turkish economy.

Table 6 presents the distribution of Syrian refugees in Turkey according to their occupational groups. It is also well-known that Syrians in high-level professional groups have entered European Union countries.

Table 6. Occupational Distribution of Syrians (2022)

Occupation Groups	Inside Camp	Outside Camp
	Male %	Female %
Engineer	0.60	0.20
Civil Servant	9.00	7.30
Manual Labor	8.20	0.50
No Profession	68.40	90.30
Office Worker	0.50	0.30
Driver	2.40	0.00
Military Worker	2.10	0.00
Health Worker	0.30	0.20
Agriculture/Animal Husbandry	2.40	0.00
Craftsman	6.20	1.20

Syrian Refugee Children: Let Them Not Be a Lost Generation

In recent years, a major humanitarian crisis has been unfolding. The war in Syria has been ongoing since 2011, and in this crisis, it is the children who continue to

bear the heaviest burden and suffer the most. The number of migrant children is rising globally, and these children face many obstacles and challenges during migration. Migrant children are considered one of the most vulnerable groups in society, and, when they migrate to a country other than their birthplace, they require greater attention, support, and protection (Crepeau, 2013). War is a terrible phenomenon. It brings traumatic experiences to both the people and the children of the country, increasing deaths, leaving people helpless and hopeless. While many people struggle for a safer and better life, over time, they begin to long for their old life, wishing to return to the times they had before. The effects of war on people include death, injury, disability, illness, torture, rape, psychological violence, forced migration, lack of education, family deaths, and socio-cultural changes. 5% of families forced to migrate lose members during migration. Among children who have lost their families due to the war, mortality is very high. 85% of deaths occur within two days of their arrival at refugee camps. Other surviving children experience issues such as language, cultural loss, and difficulties accepting new locations. Girls tend to experience the effects of war more emotionally, while boys internalize their experiences, leading to more behavioral disorders expressed outwardly (UNICEF, 2022).

Institutionalizing Education for Syrian Children

Since the beginning of the crisis, when Syrians started crossing the border into Turkey, the Ministry of National Education (MEB) established a task force called the “Syrian Education Unit” to plan for the education of Syrian children. The education program for Syrian children under temporary protection became institutionalized on May 16, 2016, with the Department of Education in Migration and Emergency Situations established under the Directorate General of Lifelong Learning (HBÖGM). Currently, matters related to the education of Syrian children are handled by HBÖGM and the Department of Education in Migration and Emergency Situations (Taştan & Çelik, 2017). According to the Ministry of Interior’s records in Turkey, over 4 million refugees are residing, and 97.1% of them are Syrian. This population has 1,124,353 Syrian children aged 5-17 (HGÖGM, 2021). As of November 2021, 731,713 Syrian children benefit from formal education opportunities, while 392,640 Syrian children do not have access to school facilities.

Table 7. School Enrolment Rates of Syrian Children in Syria and Turkey

School Level	School Enrollment Rate in Syria – 2010 (Pre-crisis)	School Enrollment Rate in Syria – 2011 (When Crisis Began)	School Enrollment Rate of Syrian Children in Turkey – 2021
Pre-primary Education	9%	10%	31.48%
Primary Education	93%	Data Not Available	75.00%
Secondary Education	66.28%	66.82%	43% (High School)

Source: Taştan & Çelik ,2017

The school enrollment rate has increased yearly, reaching 64.22% during the 2021-2022 academic year (MEB, 2023). The coverage of Turkish language classes, supported by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Youth Centers and other environments across Turkey, has also expanded. In 2019, these courses benefited 11,937 children (47% of whom were girls) (UNICEF, 2022). In the first ten months of 2019, 25,214 children (ages 6-17) benefited from language training at Public Education Centers (UNICEF, 2022). The significant number of people requiring protection crossing the borders has created numerous challenges for Turkey, particularly in terms of educational intervention in the context of the Syrian crisis. As of November 2021, 65% of school-age Syrian children were attending public schools, while approximately 400,000 Syrian children were not attending school (HGÖGM,2021). The enrollment rate for primary school was 75%, while the rate for high school was 43% (HGÖGM,2021). According to studies conducted for this report, various factors prevent Syrian children from being included in the school system. Table 8 presents the number of Syrian children attending school.

Table 8. School Distribution Numbers of Syrian Children Under Temporary Protection (as of 25.05.2022)

School Level	Number of Children
Pre-School	33,397
Primary School	387,304
Middle School	141,278
High School and Equivalent	612,846
Vocational Education	87,168

School Level

Number of Children

General Education

216,060

Source: <https://www.afad.gov.tr/suriye-raporlari>

In the early years, it was assumed that the situation would be temporary, and thus, education was prepared only for Syrian children within the camps. However, with the general directive No. 2014/21 titled “Educational Services for Foreigners,” dated September 23, 2014, the educational services for Syrian refugee children were secured. Currently, educational services for Syrian refugee children are provided through various channels, including camp-based services, out-of-camp services (Temporary Education Centers and State Schools), and private schools established by Syrians. Temporary Education Centers (TECs) are educational centers that provide education to school-age Syrian children and youth, following the Syrian curriculum and offering instruction in Arabic. These centers cover primary and secondary education (accessible at mevzuat.meb.gov.tr). The curriculum applied in these centers is the Syrian curriculum, and Syrian volunteer teachers provide education. These teachers are paid through a project conducted in collaboration with UNICEF and PTT.

Discussion and Conclusion

As discussed earlier, the language barrier faced by Syrian children and their families, the difficulties encountered during school enrolment, the necessity for these children to work to earn money, and their inability to access needed psychological support are obstacles preventing them from accessing education services and benefiting from them. It is observed that the Ministry of National Education (MEB) has undertaken several efforts to address these issues, aiming to provide Syrian children with higher-quality education. Between 2014 and 2021, the public expenditure on health and education services provided to Syrians exceeded 70 billion Turkish Liras. Considering that Turkey’s 2019 budget amounted to 960.975 billion Turkish Liras, the size of the expenditure becomes evident. However, it is difficult to claim that these expenditures were planned specifically for Syrians, with clearly defined financial sources and a well-integrated budget plan. Nonetheless, forced migration continues. Most of these individuals are attempting to pass through Turkey to reach Greece and then continue to other Balkan countries, while another portion is attempting to cross the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy. However, many of these individuals are stranded in refugee reception centers. Although there are legal regulations in EU legislation to protect migrants and refugees who are in such dire situations at the EU borders, adequate protection is not being provided, and the physical infrastructure

remains insufficient. Most refugees and migrants trying to reach the EU have had to pay organized criminal networks and human traffickers. As a result, these individuals, known as “irregular, “migrants, have not entered the EU through legal channels.

Rather than this, one of the most common problems in countries receiving migrants is xenophobia and racism. Social exclusion, economic difficulties, poor working conditions, and discrimination often lead to issues such as scapegoating. Therefore, the root causes of these problems are often discussed in the context of the countries hosting refugees (Göker & Keskin, 2015). The insufficiency of legal and financial regulations regarding the education of Syrian children primarily suggests that a realistic perspective on the migrant issue has not yet been established. Initially, as the situation was perceived as temporary and due to language barriers, education for Syrian children in Turkey was provided in camps using tents, containers, and prefabricated schools. However, it soon became apparent that these facilities were insufficient to meet the educational needs of the large number of Syrian children. Despite Turkey’s significant efforts, 392,640 Syrian children still do not attend school.

In conclusion, protection can be provided through education, as these children are sometimes at risk of exploitation, such as being recruited by militias or being forced into unsafe work (Canaz & Küçüker, 2019). With the increasing Syrian population in the coming years, it is evident that policymakers in Turkey will face significant responsibilities to manage education policies effectively. The increasing population is also expected to give rise to the issue of Arab nationalism, and it can be predicted that there may be social divisions in the future because of the rapid demographic changes in Turkey due to the arrival of Syrians.

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